


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4 August 1982

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2595

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PROSPECTS FOR MIDDLE EAST WAR EXAMINED

Beirut ISTIRATIJIYA in Arabic No 4, Feb 82 pp 9-11

[Article by Col Haytham al-Ayubi: "The Fifth War...When and Why?"]

[Text] Strategic analysts working outside the conventional balance-of-power framework are now seeing a link between the annexation of the Golan Heights by the Zionist state and the deadline for Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai this coming 26 April. In fact, these analysts go so far as to state that Israel will attempt to take advantage of the least opportunity, in the short amount of time remaining to it before withdrawal, for a military strike in southern Lebanon aimed at eliminating the military base of the Palestinian revolution. Or, the strike could be aimed at a resolution of the Syrian missile question in the Biqa', or even at direct aggression within Syrian territory. A strike of this sort would be based on the premise that it could be undertaken without fear of any Egyptian reaction as long as President Husni Mubarak, fearful of providing Israel with any pretext or hindrance from its evacuation from the occupied Sinai, continues to adopt the position of a mere observer.

This active connection between Israel's aggressive intentions in the months to come and the deadline for withdrawal from the Sinai follows in the wake of continuing efforts by Egypt to improve (white-wash) the president's standing in the Arab world as a prelude to Egypt's readiness to return to the Arab fold. These efforts are being undertaken under the broad rubric of "solidarity" without any attempt at defining the aims and objectives of such solidarity. And there is no need to be reminded that Egypt's return to the Arab ranks is a matter of strategic importance of the first degree. It is the hope of all struggling Arabs who appreciate the role played by Egypt before its defection, and who appreciate Egypt's importance in the region's balance of power. But the militant Egypt of yesterday is a far cry from today's "non-aligned" Egypt weighed down by a separate (unilateral) peace treaty and a totally dependent economic-military relationship with the United States.

In light of this, it is necessary for us to remain detached from speculations (widely circulated in Arab intellectual circles at present) about the possibility of a change in Egypt's regime after 26 April. This is because any change in the right direction is going to be a long-term process involving more than just a change of rulers. A positive change would require a qualitative change, one that would adjust the balance between active forces internally (in Egypt).

It would necessitate turning Egypt's foreign relations on its head, so to speak, and allow for a build-up of the country's armed forces independent of America's will. Only then would it be possible to introduce new forces on the region's balance of power, forces that could be regarded as a potent factor in the strategic struggle against Zionist penetrations.

To those who link the anticipated fifth Arab-Israeli war with April 1982, we pose this question: What is it possible for Mubarak to do in case war does not break out after the Sinai evacuation? They will find that (Egypt's) good intentions alone--assuming they are there in the first place--will not necessarily have any impact on the existing balance of forces (in the short run, at least). The regime has supplanted the old, conflict-oriented intellectual climate that reigned before the October War with an extremely defeatist/pacifist mentality within the armed forces. It has implanted within the military new meanings to the concept of the struggle against Zionism, such as "as long as it is impossible to defeat Israel in war, why not try to defeat it through peaceful routes?" It is a situation entirely opposed to the fighting spirit needed to affect the balance of forces. The Egyptian forces today are armed with Soviet weapons that haven't been up-dated or renewed in more than 5 years. These are weaponry that are in need of overhaul, spare parts, and ammunition stores if a modern war is to be undertaken. Or else, Egypt's forces are equipped with Western arms (mainly American) which the United States will not allow to be used against Israel (unless we suppose that Washington would like to see its interests endangered and the destruction of that very base that is charged with protecting them), and which are qualitatively inferior with respect to those American arms possessed by Israel.

Egypt's forces are spread out over the west bank of the (Suez) Canal and on the Egyptian-Libyan border. Any mobilization of forces from east to west precludes the advantage of surprise on Egypt's part (which is unlikely, in any case). Then, crossing the canal and equipping for entering into battle would require more time than would be possible under circumstances of a sudden Israeli strike. And the American force presently found in the Sinai, despite its small numbers and scattered location, is a symbolic barrier which the Egyptian regime cannot ignore without having a complete political restructuring in the nature of its relationship with the imperialist camp. The U.S. force also serves as an early-warning trip-wire for the Zionist state.

Under these circumstances, any talk of Israel exploiting the next three months for a military strike in the north, or any expectation of a sudden change in Mubarak's position after 26 April, is actually a form of self-deception. Such thinking ignores the enormous gulf created by the al-Sadatists between Arab Egypt and its national role; it deprecates the dangerous developments insisted upon by Israel in exchange for agreeing to relinquish the Sinai without resort to violence; it underestimates the wedge driven into the heart of the Arab resistance camp by the United States, a camp to whose efficacy Egypt was crucial. Therefore, it is necessary to reveal these illusions for what they are, before they turn into given assumptions, adding to the already existing, mistaken assumptions that currently impede the building of a unified Arab strategy, e.g., the possibility of obtaining arms from the West with which to fight Israel, negotiations with the enemy from a position of weakness and under the auspices of the United States, and agreeing to recognize Israel for the sake of a just peace. (How can there be a just peace when any part of Arab land is under occupation?)

To be sure, this insistence on separating the issue of a fifth Arab-Israeli war from the approaching 26 April date is not at all intended to say that the Zionist state is not about to carry out any military operations before or after this date. What is intended is the point that the Israeli government never took into account Mubarak's position when it decided to annex the Golan, just as it won't worry about its southern flank in case of war breaking out before (or after) April. Only one factor determined the annexation of the Golan, the same factor that will determine the decision to go to war: the change in the balance of power to Israel's favor, accompanied by the conviction that Israel will stand to gain much more than it might lose in military or political terms.

The truth of the matter is that this change in the balance of power that enables the Zionist military to pose a constant challenge to the Arab nation and threaten to strike at any place or time it sees fit is not only a result of Israeli effort and American aid; this change is primarily the product of the Arab state of affairs. And if the Israelis have started preparing for a fifth war again since the last fighting in October 1973, then it is certain that they have studied their past mistakes carefully, and have implemented basic improvements in methods of infiltration, intelligence, armament, and the use of weapons. And while successive U.S. administrations since 1973 have shared in rearming the Zionist military, increasing its fire-power and maneuverability, and facilitating better intelligence-gathering and observation, it is equally true that the sorry state of Arab affairs has acted to enhance Israel's military superiority many times over, with the result that an ascendent, Zionist military capability is confronted with a deteriorating Arab capability.

Israeli-American plans ensured that Zionist military might would grow as Arab military might decreased (in practice), despite an apparent aggrandizement of the latter. Due to al-Sadatist ideology, Egypt removed itself from the military equation and thereby prevented any amassment of Arab ground troops from North Africa. Then came the Iraqi-Iranian war, which served to deprive the confrontation line of any benefit from any nation capable of sending troops quickly and in large amounts to the battlefield. Furthermore, it was the desire to remain under the American wing that contributed to delay in the use of the economic weapon (oil) and a portion of the military arsenal (American in origin), and which served to impede the cultivation of an alliance with Moscow.

Since the beginning of the conflict Israel had to face several strategic, military pressures, the foremost being: fighting along two or more fronts; the quick transition of Arab forces to operational mobilization; the possibility of drawing the Palestinians into the conflict using war-of-attrition, hit-and-run tactics; a quantitative Arab military superiority with which Israel could not compete; and the capacity for a strategic, sudden strike on the part of the Arabs. In order to cope with these pressures, Israel based its military strategy according to the following principles: to fight all along its borders; to knock out one front quickly and then concentrating on the other; to launch pre-emptive strikes before full Arab mobilization is completed; to cultivate intelligence in order to preclude surprise attacks; to strike behind enemy lines; to consolidate its hold over the cease-fire lines in order to be secure before the outbreak of the war, and to launch its attack from these lines when war does happen; etc., etc.

It is because of the Zionist military's successes on a number of past occasions that its delusions of grandeur remained strong, and then increased until the 1973 war. They were then jolted, however, and unable to prevent the Arab transformation of strategic depth into a theatre of operations. Israel was forced to wage a war on two fronts. Consolidation and intelligence failed to obtain the required security. There was no time for a pre-emptive strike. It was expected that Israel's delusions of grandeur would keep on growing until it fell into a trap which it could not easily escape, thereby tipping the scales of power in the favor of the Arab camp. However, it was the Arab state of affairs which allowed Israel to escape the trap, and helped ameliorate Israel's strategic circumstances. Israel then did not have to return to fighting on two fronts, or deal with quantitatively superior forces (quantitative superiority changes into qualitative superiority). It did not have to take air action or hinder efforts to prevent the disparate Arab forces from reaching the front line, since it could rest assured that these forces were not about to mobilize to begin with (at least, not in sufficient numbers to affect the balance of forces). In contrast, the military performance of the Palestinian revolution during the war of attrition which it was forced to wage in Lebanon sufficed to achieve the desired ends, even after the setbacks of 1970 and 1971 in Jordan and before the revolution had fully recovered from them.

We can see that the American-Israeli efforts were aimed at self-aggrandizement of the Zionist military, just as the Arab situation was working to free Israel from its delusions of grandeur. The Arab situation changed the balance of power in the region into one that consisted solely of a contest between Israeli forces and Syrian forces supported by the Palestinian revolution (and some token forces sent by other Arab countries). Economic weapons quickly disappeared from the list of forces eligible for use in the conflict. In light of such sorry circumstances, it was only natural that Israel should have annexed the Golan Heights, and that it should find it necessary later to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is because of the imbalance in the equation of forces--and for no other reason--that a fifth war might break out (possible an all-out war between Israel and Syria, or possible one confined to the Biqa' or southern Lebanon).

So, while the possibility of total war for a fifth time is not ruled out entirely, it is certain that the conflict would cost Israel more than it would gain. The first penalty Israel would pay in case of war with Syria may be discerned from the equation of forces which Syria is trying to equalize through a policy of self-sufficiency, strengthening ties with Moscow, and attempting to rally the Arabs' will to fight around the idea of Arab solidarity (which could, in the short run at least, acquire a confrontational attitude towards the enemy).

Some other basic deterrents explaining Israel is unlikely to start a fifth war with Syria are represented as follows:

1. Israel would be likely to incur heavy losses if it confronts the Syrian armed forces spread throughout the Golan.

2. The belief shared by Americans and Israelis that it is less costly for them to wear Syria down through conspiratorial plots within Syria and Lebanon than by risking a direct clash.

3. The United States fears that an American-backed war in Syria agitate popular opinion within sister Arab nations, thereby raising the possibility of violent movements aimed at the regimes already in place at a time when openly-declared strategic commitments are increasingly being called for.

4. The Soviet Union's declared support for Damascus and its legitimate right to self-defense. The USSR is capable of advancing such support now that it is free from the demands of the Polish situation, which has changed a critical question to an internal matter that the Poles themselves have undertaken to resolve.

The truth of the matter is that there has been an increase lately, in the number of factors likely to lead to an Israeli-Syrian war, factors arising from both sides of the trenches. Damascus regards the annexation of the Golan as an end to the cease-fire and an open invitation to war. It is an invitation which Syria must accept, in light of its commitments to the rejectionist front and its desire for liberation. Syria also believes that any war with the enemy will act to crystallize the strategic commitments of other Arab nations, and will bring an end to the military dissolution imposed by the Arabs of the United States on their own people.

It will act to galvanize the will to fight once more among the Arabs. As for the Zionist state, the dominant line of thinking believes that a strike against Syrian forces simply conforms to the framework of past pre-emptive strikes, and that it should be done soon because of the growing speed and capacity of the Syrian military, and because of the increasing possibility of Damascus achieving strategic parity. It is evident that Syria's resoluteness in its political position has helped in limiting the danger caused by Camp David and has prevented its implementation. It is the same resoluteness that helped block the change from Camp David to "Camp Fahd." It is this state of affairs that will make a fifth Israeli war a war aimed at breaking Syria's resolve to do battle, in order to conform to the logic of Camp David and remove the Syrian-Palestinian obstacle to the Fahd plan. Because of the effect of mounting pressure for war on Damascus, and in light of the existing balance of forces, the fifth war (if it should be a Syrian war) will take the form of a long and violent war of attrition, with help coming from the Soviet Union and increasing economic aid that will serve to expand the war's scope. A war of this kind can have only two ends:

1. To raise the state of Arab affairs to the forefront, hastening the clarification of the configuration of strategic alignment in the region, and transform the concept of "steadfastness and confrontation" into a reality.

2. To impose on the Zionist enemy more losses, human and material, than it can easily afford or be easily absorbed by society.

But a war of this nature, despite what it could do to impair American-Zionist hegemony in the region, remains a matter of utmost danger. The Zionist state is moving towards escalating hostilities, either towards all-out war or at least shelling into Arab territory. At this point it will be either the stand taken by the Soviets, or the nature of Syria's air defense, that will enter into American-Israeli calculations on whether or not to escalate the situation.

Pressures within Israel towards war (which are strong) might lead to full military operations, or else possibly an air strike, against Syrian amassments of troops, surface-to-air missile batteries, air bases, and other vital military-economic targets in the infrastructure. In either case, Israeli action will include activating the front and a detour via Jordan, or Lebanon, or in both directions simultaneously. But a military decision of this enormity cannot afford to ignore these constraints which we mentioned above. It would be a showcase for a military setback for Israel, especially since the Soviet Union has presented Damascus with some of its best weaponry for its armed forces. This makes for the distinct possibility that Israel might end up falling into a trap from which it could not easily escape, a trap of "SAM-6" missiles and anti-tank missiles, just like in the 1973 war. Added to this is the fact that the United States--which doubtless will give Israel the green light-believes that a war of this kind, be it on the ground or in the air, and whether or not successful, will hardly lead to a more flexible Syrian position; it would, on the contrary, harden Syria's position. Nor does the United States underestimate the Syrian military's ability to absorb the blows and rapidly rebuild its military base, thanks to Arab money and Soviet technology. Based on our work so far, and on the enormous number of casualties expected, the chances for surprise, and the slim psychological-political gains to be had (even if Israel were to win the war), we are led to conclude that it is unlikely--but not impossible--that Israel should resort to such a high-risk adventure. Israeli aggression can be vented elsewhere, in other forms, at less risk. In this event, Israel may make one of two choices: an air attack in the Biqa', or a ground war in the South of Lebanon.

The aim of the first choice would be to destroy Syrian missile bases by sending waves of pilotless aircraft over the Biqa' in order to wear down Syria's surface-to-air missile deployment. Syria's missile system would be faced with attacks from fighter planes looming overhead, at a sloping altitude, armed with air-to-surface missiles guided by laser and television. However, a war of this kind--according to American experts--would lead to greater losses in aircraft and pilots than Israel could allow (even if the scheme were to succeed), whereas Syria would be able to replenish its missile inventory in record time thanks to supplies provided by the Soviets' "air bridge." Nor would it be possible for Israel to embark on an air war of this sort without considering Syria's capacity for a missile response that would result in enormous Israeli losses, in human terms and in military-economic terms. Israeli losses would exceed Syrian losses in both absolute and relative terms, leaving the Israeli operation with no practical results.

To be sure, Israel possesses long-distance air-to-surface missiles that would allow Israel to strike Syrian missile bases in the Biqa' staying safely outside of their range. But Israel cannot guarantee (according to U.S. information)

that Syria is not in possession of Soviet long-range surface-to-air missiles capable of shooting down Israeli planes over the occupied lands once they leave their airbases. Similarly, Israel's ability to fly over the eastern and western mountain ranges of Lebanon without detection has declined rapidly since Syria has obtained (and this has been affirmed by the British Institute for Strategic Studies) Soviet-made planes of the "Tupolev-126 MUS" type. This allows Syria to detect Israeli aircraft as soon as they leave their bases or during their climb to altitudes beyond the range of ground radar. Israel is unable to jam these planes' radar systems, which they would need to do for an operation of the kind described above so as not to incur losses in excess of an acceptable (cost-return) ratio.

The aim of the second type of war, a war inside Lebanon, would be to remove the Palestinian armed forces from the border with the occupied lands (Israel) now that the "buffer-zone" (with its present depth) has proved to be a failure in providing complete security for the settlements in the northern Golan.

There is also the desire to destroy Palestinian military bases and occupy parts of Lebanon in order to use them as bargaining chips in drawing Lebanon into a Sadat-like position. In this case, it would be impossible for Israel--despite American support--to ignore the presence of the international peace-keeping forces in the South, or to forget the heavy loss of life incurred when it last confronted Lebanese national forces and the Palestinian revolution. This is why it is expected that Israeli operations will depend primarily on those isolationist forces which it has armed (phase one) and for which it will act as a fire-power base and supply source. In this manner the war will take or assume a political coloring of less danger for Israel, as well as confining its losses to the ranks of Sa'd Haddad.

However, even the maximum number of men that these militias are able to mobilize is limited by the smallnesses of the human reservoir from which they are volunteers, their low quality of fighting skills, and their inability--even when supported and propped by Israel to the limit--to score any military gains within reasonable casualty parameters. This especially holds true since the Palestinian revolution and its allies in the South have been increasing their military might and capability for confrontation.

This is why an operation of the sort contemplated by Israel, based on isolationist forces, requires the transferral to the South of isolationist forces in the north, in order to bolster the southern isolationist forces. This can hardly be effected in secret, nor will it lead to anything but a jolt to those traditional Arab bases of support upon which rest the isolationists of the north.

In any case, no matter which manner the Israelis try to invade the South, and whether they use Zionist soldiers or "Zionified" soldiers, the outcome of the invasions, and the objectives it desires, are from certain for Israel. The reason for this is that the Palestinians and the Lebanese patriotic forces are going to meet the invasion with a very fluid, malleable, yet dynamic defense strategy which will preclude military decimation by Israel. Similarly, expanding the buffer-zone will not serve to prevent penetration and crossovers, or action inside Israel by military cells. It is due to the overwhelming support of the Palestinian revolution by the patriotic forces, which truly believe in a firm

confrontational stance towards Israel, that the al-Sadatists are unable to move about freely in Lebanon. Otherwise, the al-Sadatists would have achieved their aims in the time elapsed since the 1978 war in the South.

There are presently more contributing factors to the outbreak of war than there have been at any other time in the past. Moreover, the American-Israeli side is the side anxious for war, and are prepared for it materially and in spirit, only if they can guarantee crushing the Arab will to fight, paving the way for defeatists old and new and weakening the Arab resistance line. However, local and international constraints on their freedom of movement will induce Washington and Israel to take a long hard look, and make some careful calculations, before striking--now that Israel is no longer the only determined will in the region, and now that the United States is no longer the only determined will in the world.

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CSO: 4404/367

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TUNISIAN-ALGERIAN CONTROVERSIES--Algeria has curtailed travel by its citizens to Tunisia just as it has restricted the entry of Tunisians into its territory. It has made them subject to the laws which apply to foreigners such as residence [laws] and others after the residence of Tunisians in Algeria was not subject to these laws because of the traditional relations between the two countries. It is frequently mentioned that the reason for the Algerian measures might be new disagreements between Tunisia and Algeria which have accumulated since the nomination of Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, the current Algerian Foreign Minister, as ambassador of his country to Tunisia. It is well-known that Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi played a major part in preparing and paving the way for the armed Qafsah operation in 1980. [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 242, 12 Jul 82 p 10]

CSO: 4504/425

BRIEFS

FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE FOR OPEC URGED--OAPEC has suggested to OPEC that it adopt an independent production policy by creating a joint financial reserve fund. Withdrawals from this fund could be made in the event that prices drop so that the countries whose incomes are affected are not compelled to increase production or borrow from the West to make ends meet. In its monthly bulletin published in Kuwait OAPEC said that a balance must be maintained. This means that production must be raised when prices are high to take advantage of them on condition that the higher revenues during that period are placed in reserve, to be utilized when prices fall. The bulletin said that the hard-pressed situation the OPEC nations find themselves in at the present time is the result of the organization's willingness to undertake the role of "supplementary producer" in the oil market--that is, the producer to whom the market resorts to supply its requirements after it gets what it considers appropriate from other sources. The bulletin added that by accepting this role OPEC is now burdened with balancing world supply and demand for oil. According to OAPEC this harmful situation would not have come about if OPEC had adopted an independent production and oil exporting policy reflecting the financial needs of its members. Implementing such a policy requires a very high level of awareness of joint responsibility among the OPEC nations; it is not easy for independent nations in differing circumstances with regard to oil reserves and economic development requirements to devise a unified production policy. [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 235, 24 May 82 p 38] 9123

CSO: 4404/536

PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

PSYCHOLOGIST DISCUSSES EFFECTS OF WESTERNIZATION OF GULF CULTURE

Manama AL-BAHRAIN in Arabic No 665, 3 Jun 82 pp 46-48

[Interview with Dr Muhammad 'Uthman al-Marazaqi, professor of psychology by AL-BAHRAIN: "Arab Traditions and U.S.: Do We Accept Them or Reject Them?" date and place not specified]

[Text] Gulf society is going through fast-paced changes resulting basically from within society but also from contact and interaction with other societies, particularly Western society, which have exerted influence over the individual and the family structure in the Gulf. What is this influence? What are the negative influences and social diseases which we have inherited from Western civilization? Does Western education have side-effects on Gulf life?

To answer these questions, we met with Dr Muhammad 'Uthman al-Marazqi, professor of psychology.

[Question] Does our difference from Western culture mean that we totally reject it?

[Answer] That is not possible. As individuals, either: we reject Western culture in its entirety, and regard it as a contagious disease that we must resist with all the means at our disposal; or--we embrace Western culture completely, which of course would be an unhealthy attitude to take because this would require that society abandon all of the manners, ways, and thinking to which it has become accustomed. And it would require that society don other ways, means and thinking that is alien to it, which necessarily leads to dislocation in the individual and in society as a whole;--we assume the attitude of someone bewildered and confused: attracted to elements in our own culture and traditions at times, and rejecting them in favor of Western culture, at others.

[Question] How has Western culture influenced Gulf society?

[Answer] Western culture has greatly influenced Gulf society, including:

--Material influence. Western culture has introduced our society to several conveniences, such as automobiles, refrigerators, televisions, etc. But it has also brought with it several problems, such as the fact that the number of

automobile accidents in the Gulf are increasing sharply. This may be attributed to several reasons, such as the existence of fast and powerful cars but not suitable roads, or to an absence of sufficient driving knowledge among citizens. We see clearly here that the presence of a car on the road is evidence of cultural progress, accompanied to some extent by the realization of the dangers it entails. But with the advancement in education and attention by the media to this sort of problem, and with an emphasis on youth in particular, the number of accidents will naturally diminish. The same may also be said of electrical and pipeline accidents, etc.

--Spiritual influences following upon the first point, we find that society is being transformed into a society made up of individuals who love acquiring modern things, to the point that rivalry in status symbols has become clearly apparent in our society. Cultural mediums have aided in bringing out this phenomenon clearly and in different ways. For instance, wedding celebrations are given in the most luxuriant hotels when the family is often unable to cover their expenses.

Similarly, certain Western gadgets like the video have a somewhat destructive influence on the thinking and behavior of the individual. Video sales in our region are considered to be among the highest (proportionally) in the world. They are mainly used to show comedy movies instead of being used as an educational and cultural instrument.

Also, the availability of material things, along with the supply of modern instruments and gadgets coming from the West has led to a feeling among individuals, especially children, that everything in life may be obtained easily. As a result, the value in the challenge of obtaining things has lost its power and meaning. As the English historian Toynbee put it, "The challenge of building the future in a society results from the feeling that it is essential for the preservation of its existence. But if life is easy, and challenge no longer carries any meaning, then cultural stagnation sets in." Or, as the old saying goes, "Easily won, easily lost." As far as the new generation is concerned, the child is raised with everything made easy for him, from a material standpoint. He might be found with a pile of toys that he doesn't know what to do with. He gets them whether he behaves well or not. We must avoid creating a generation that doesn't appreciate the value of things, even of human life itself in the sense of its trials, hopes, and pleasures. I cannot generalize about this, because there certainly are individuals and families who do appreciate the value of things, and who appreciate the seriousness of life and the value of hard work in the road to progress. That type will surely be the one to bear the banner of progress.

[Question] Does Western education produce side-effects on Gulf life?

[Answer] Naturally, Western education has many effects. No one would contend that it is a means of rationality and scientific thinking, and a realistic way of viewing life. However, there are some ideas that come to us by way of certain philosophies that are not compatible with the philosophy of Arab society. They influence some individuals under certain circumstances, such a deprivation and need. Or, they could influence a person due to the way he is treated within

the family, or at work. For example, if a young man learns abroad that it is necessary and good for him to express his opinion, and then he returns to his family where he works and feels just the opposite, this young man might experience feelings of frustration. Instead of enthusiasm towards his work, he stops giving it all of his energy. Hence, society loses a part of the young man's potential energy. This leads us to define what sociologists term "alienation": The individual occasionally may have certain modern ideas which he believes in. For instance, he may believe that the work-crew should lead the work organization and not just the manager. Or, he may want to write an objective appraisal of a certain job, listing the good and the bad. If he is not able to do so, the individual then becomes alienated from society. There are several kinds of alienated persons in our Arab society. The first kind is the sort of person described earlier. The second is the rebellious sort due to his own and to society's conditions. He therefore believes in Western ideas on society in order to demolish or change in structure by his own methods. The last kind is the cultured alienated person who sees in the philosophy of Western culture the ideal way of thinking. Surprisingly, a great many of these are alienated in their youth but later become strongly attached to their culture and Arab traditions as they advance in age.

[Question] We notice that there is a change in the behavior of those who have studied abroad and return here. Why is that?

[Answer] There are different sorts of this type also. There are those who are characterized by their depth of thought, self-confidence, and confidence in society. They go abroad and benefit from the good and the rational. They learn how to appraise matters well, and how to plan their lives, etc. This type returns home to benefit society.

The other type is the superficial sort whose outer shell in the few years spent abroad acquires some of the good things mentioned above. But deep down inside, he remains the same. Upon his return home, he feigns an air of superiority over his family and clansmen. After a short time he loses the shell he has acquired. With it, he loses the love and esteem of his family. This type crops up among deceitful people and those who assume bigger responsibility than they can handle. Two very perjorative terms are used to describe this type. The first is "delusions of grandeur"; the second is "paranoia" towards everyone higher up than they. Naturally, this is not a good thing.

[Question] Has Western culture affected the individual's relations with his family? How?

[Answer] Naturally, we find one type of family that is open by nature. And by the very nature of its familiarity with its own culture, and by the way it is raised, this type of family has nothing to fear from European culture. We find it to be successful in any endeavor it chooses.

There is also the type of family that cannot accept change and development. We usually find problems between the boys and the girls in varying proportions. There is deviation, tension, worry in this family. The girl is usually treated more harshly than the boy. By virtue of his sex, the male child enjoys more rights than the female.

The manner in which the girl tries to get her opinion across usually takes on a very dramatic form. For instance, she may resort to fainting or attempts at suicide.

Then there is the contradictory type of family that accepts Western culture as a means of making its living, yet in its manner of dealing with its children retains the old method, relying on authority.

[Question] What are the social ills that we have inherited from Western culture?

[Answer] Western culture has left us with numerous social ills. Among them are: less faith and trust between individuals; increasing legal problems, like swindling and falsification in all their different forms; the introduction of drugs, a problem which has affected our youth in a very negative way and which demands study so as to combat the problem in its infancy. I believe that the process of cultural progress has led to an increase in nervous ailments. Certain studies conducted in European villages that were being penetrated by city-life showed an increase in the number of individual afflicted with anxiety. The reason for this was that the individual's ambitions start to preoccupy his thoughts. The future starts to take on new meaning, where before he had been living simply for the moment and for the day.

9945

CSO: 4404/540

PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

FOOD SECURITY DISCUSSED--The subject of food security dominated the GCC conference of deputy ministers of trade held last wee (27 May) in Kuwait, chaired by the Saudi deputy minister of trade, Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abdallah al-Zamil. The participants came up with recommendations to be presented to the ministers of trade. These recommendations state that it is necessary to coordinate import and export policies and create a unified negotiating force. They also assigned the secretary general of the GCC to gather data on the following: 1. GCC imports of basic foodstuffs, particularly rice, sugar, wheat, milk, vegetable oil, grease, meat, fodder, cement and iron; 2. the main GCC exports; 3. the countries that are the main trading partners with the Gulf nations; 4. the conditions of trade between the GCC nations and various other countries, and a comparison of them with existing conditions in international trade relations, particularly within the international economic blocs, and between these blocs and the various countries of the world. Noting a basic point agreed upon at the meeting Dr al-Zamil said that it is necessary to coordinate policies relating to the creation of a strategic food stockpile. A committee consisting of officials concerned with food security programs and grain elevators will be formed to study the status of the strategic food stockpile and the policies being applied toward achieving it, as well as the possibilities of exchange in emergency situations. [Excerpt] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 277, 12 Jun 82 p 45] 9123

CSO: 4404/536

MINISTRY PROMOTES PUBLIC WORKS CAMPAIGN

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3-6 Jul 82 p 2

[Text]

[3 Jul 82 p 2] Part I

The Public Works Ministry has the pleasure and great honour to see that its workers and officials, due to their high character of patriotism, with utmost courage, and energy and with great interest in the building of Afghanistan, in the light of the scientific methods of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, have been able in 1360 H.S. (1981-82) to accomplish their tasks in accordance with the planned programmes.

A summary of the activities of the different organs of the ministry in the area of the civil and industrial constructions and communications is given below:

A—Civil and industrial constructions:

The Institute of City and Constructional Projects works as an organisation of engineering and consultative services and the central department of preliminary studies and analysis of plans and designs and preparation of technical documents in the mapping of building projects and city planning in its full sense.

In the course of 1360, the institute had 157 projects in its plan, out of which 147 were big and the rest smaller.

It must be mentioned that, out of the 147 big projects, 41 were carry over projects, while 106 were contracted in 1360 and newly undertaken.

Of these 106, in turn, 62 were larger than the rest.

Of the 41 carry over projects, 20 were bigger than the rest.

The number of projects completed in 1360 was 75. The total income of the institute through the preparation of technical documents, planning, design and analysis reached the sum of Afs 46.6 million.

The state investment in the construction of these projects is estimated at about Afs 990—1,000 million.

The institute possesses the fundamental status of a technical basis for construction at the national level for all organisations and ministries, especially for

the State Planning Committee, and has spared no efforts in playing this role.

With a view to raising the scientific level and creating national cadres by utilising new methods, determination of design norms, scientific research and development, publication of useful and quality works, the institute has carried out fruitful activities. In the same manner, it has played an outstanding role in convening scientific seminars and meetings.

CONSIDERATION

The institute, in its financial plan, has taken into consideration all the aspects of full implementation of the constructions and efficiency in its activities and successfully implemented its working plan for 1360.

Similarly, having in view its activities in 1360, it has made of effective projections within the limits of possibilities.

The institute has also supervised all the planned projects technically and rendered help from the viewpoint of quality and speed of the work by giving technical advice to different organisations.

All the provincial branches of the institute have successfully performed th-

eir duties in the implementation of the entrusted tasks within the limits of possibilities.

2. Afghan Construction Unit:

The Afghan Construction Unit was established in 1340 (1961), to carry out construction of administrative, industrial and cultural buildings for state establishments and departments, especially on the basis of competition with foreign construction companies which were earlier monopolising the work.

The ACU could manage in a short span of time to achieve its aims by persistent and patriotic work. It has satisfied the demand of our compatriots by building large buildings and also made the foreign monopoly companies pack up and leave the country.

The capital of the ACU was Afs 300 million in the beginning of the Saur Revolution. But, due to the urgent need to rebuild the country, the paid-up capital of the ACU was raised to Afs 1,000 million.

At present, the constructional capability, technical establishments, machine tools and technical and administrative personnel of the ACU are as follows:

a. Monetary spendings in the building activities exceed Afs 1 billion annually.

b. Machine tools and vehicular means amount to 350 units.

c. Personnel and officials.
1. 120 engineers and technicians.

2. Technical workers and other permanent workers and wage earners number 3,300.

3. Administrative and executive personnel number 350.

4. Workers earning daily wages in the centre and provinces' projects number 7,000.

Total: 10,720.

d. The ACU has gravel washing factories, carpentry, stone-cutting and trestle work units, all well-equipped and uptodate. These produce adequate amounts of materials needed for the projects as well as for help or sale to other organisations and individuals.

e. The ACU has over 50 building projects in hand at present, some of which are big factories and important complexes such as the Cement Factory of Herat, the big drinking water project of Afshar, the large flour and wheat silos and mechanical bakeries of Kabul, Pule Khumri and Mazari Sharif, and the 18-storey building of the Communications Ministry.

The ACU is determined to render better services to the country and the people in future, in accordance with the development and constructional plans of the state.

Having in view the regional difficulties and the shortage of building materials and manpower, the unit has still been able in the course of 1360 to spend about Afs 550 million in the building projects in the capital and the provinces, reports on which have been submitted to the interested bodies. The state has netted Afs 70 million through these activities.

Also, in the same period, as many as 16 projects valued at Afs 634.36 million have been completed and handed over to the user-organisations for utilisation.

The projects which have been completed during the year will not be cited here, but the large projects which are under construction to be completed in the coming years are as follows.

Large building projects under construction and to be completed in the coming year.

1. The large centre of communications at Kabul belonging to the Ministry of Communications:

This will be built in seven blocks of two, three, five and eighteen storeys. These will be very modern and equipped with central heating, air-conditioning, water distribution, canalization and telephone. The construction work of this project had started in 1356 (1977) and up to the end of 1360 (1981) over 50 per cent of its work was done.

At a cost of about Afs 458.7 million, this project will be completed by the end of 1362 (1983). The total volume of these buildings will be 92,563 cubic metres.

2. The laboratory complex related to the Ministry of Mines and Industries:

This project comprises three blocks of two, three and five storeys with a total volume of about 53,000 sq metres.

The construction work of this project had started in 1357 (1978). Work continued in full swing in the year 1359 (1980) and, by the end of 1360 (1981), about 40 per cent of the work was done.

Its construction cost is estimated at Afs 100 million and it is planned to be completed by the end of 1361 (1982).

3. The complex of the State Information Services in Kabul:

This project will comprise 14 different buildings possessing administrative offices, dining halls for the officers and privates, a kitchen, rest houses, teaching rooms, arms godowns, workshops, and so on with a total volume of 49,215 cubic metres.

The construction cost of this project is estimated at Afs. 221 million and is located adjacent to the Government Printing Press.

The construction work of this complex had started in the middle of 1360 (1981) with three per cent of its work completed by the end of that year. The work on this project will be completed in the three years.

This complex will be equipped with all modern facilities such as central heating, water supply, air conditioning, water closets, electricity, telephone and so on.

4. The Cinema theatre of the Central SIS:

This cinema will have a capacity of 400 viewers at one time and its total volume will be 6,430 cubic metres. It will be built at a cost of Afs 17.7 million.

So far, over 50 per cent of its construction work is completed and it is planned to be finished by the end of 1361 (1982).

5. The dormitories of the Kabul University related to

the Higher and Vocational Education Ministry.

This building will accommodate 800 people and will be built in five blocs with a total volume of 57,800 cubic metres in four storeys.

The construction work of this project had started in 1357 (1978) and so far 50 per cent of the work has been accomplished.

The project is planned to be finished by the middle of 1362 (1983) at a total cost of Afs. 265 million.

With the completion of this project, the needs of the Kabul University will be somehow met. These buildings will have also administrative offices and dining halls equipped with modern facilities such as central heating, water supply, water closets, electricity and alarm.

6. Classrooms of the Kabul University related to the Higher and Vocational Education Ministry:

The work on this project had started in August 1978 (Asad, 1357) and, by the end of 1360 (1981), 80 per cent of its construction work was completed.

The cost of construction was estimated at Afs 150 million. It is to be equipped with all modern facilities such as central heatings, water supply and electricity. The project is planned to be completed by the end of 1361 (1982).

7. The water supply project of Afshar related to the water supply and canalization department of the Ministry:

The construction work of this project had started in 1359 (1980) and 65 per cent of its work was completed by the end of 1360

(1981).

The construction cost is estimated at Afs 298 million. With the completion of this project, the residents of Khairkhana Mena, Parwan Mena, Kartai Mamin, Shahri Naw, Khus-hhal Khan Mena, Speen Kalay and other areas will have adequate clean, hygienic water at their disposal.

8. The Herat Cement Production Project related to the Ministry of Mines and Industries:

The construction work of this project had started in 1356 (1977) and by the end of 1359 (1980) about 83 per cent of its work was accomplished.

In 1360 (1981), however, the work on this project had stopped due to regional conditions.

[6 Jul 82] Part IV

The productive capacity of this project will be 700 tons of cement in 24 hours. It will be built on an area of [figure indistinct] square metres at an estimated cost of Afs 370 million.

9. The project of the complex for the production of building materials related to the National Defence Ministry.

The work on this project had started in 1358 (1979) and, by the end of 1360 (1981), over 90 per cent of its work was completed.

This project has a volume of 91,120 cubic metres and its cost is estimated at Afs 90 million.

10. The new hotel of Kandahar related to the hotel's enterprise department.

This hotel will be built in five blocks. One block of it will have seven storeys, while the rest will be modifications of the previous hotel.

The construction work of this project had started in 1357 and is expected to be complete by the middle of 1361 (1982). This hotel will have 300 beds and equipped with all modern facilities such as central heating, air-conditioning, lifts and other modern facilities.

The construction cost is estimated at Afs 150 million.

11. The complex of Pule Khumri Silo related to the Ministry of Commerce:

This project comprises a silo, a mill, a mechanised bakery and other needed accessories.

The construction work started in (August 1979) and by the end of 1981 over 70 per cent of it was completed. It will probably be complete by the end of the current year.

The construction cost is estimated at Afs 296.43 million. It will have an annual production capacity of 200,000 tons.

12. The mill and the silo of Pule Khumri related to the Commerce Ministry:

The construction work of this project had started in the mid-1358 and, by the end of 1360 (1981), over 70 per cent of its work

was completed. It is planned that this project will be over by mid-1361 (1982) and will be ready for utilisation.

The productive capacity of its mill would be 60 tons in 24 hours and the construction cost is estimated at Afs 71.84 million.

13. The project of 500 families of the Gin and Press of Mazari Sharif currently belonging to the air force:

The construction work of this project had started in 1358 H.S. (1979) and, by the end of 1360 (1981), over 90 per cent of its work was completed.

It is expected that the project will be ready for utilisation soon, by the middle of the current year.

The construction cost is estimated at Afs 50 million.

14. The new hotel of Bamian related to the tourist department:

The new hotel of Bami-

an is one of the most up-to-date hotels equipped with highly modern facilities. The construction work was started in 1356 H.S. and, by the end of the second quarter of 1358 (1979), 26 per cent of it was completed.

The construction cost is estimated at Afs 140 million.

15. Eight residential blocks of the Herat textile mills related to the Mines and Industries Ministry:

This project will be built in eight blocks each block for four families. The construction work was started in 1359 H.S. (1980) and is going on according to the plan.

It is expected to be complete by the end of the current year and be ready for utilisation.

The construction cost is estimated at Afs 30.5 million.

(To be continued)

CSO: 4600/652

SEMINAR FOCUSES SUPPORT FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 30 May 82 p 3

[Article by R.N.: "Prejudices To Be Overcome"]

[Text] The sessions of the national seminar on technical education opened at the Palace of the Nations (Algiers) yesterday in the presence of M'hamed Nabi and Larbi Ould Khelifa, members of the Central Committee and, respectively, minister of vocational training and secretary of state for secondary and technical education.

The seminar, which has been organized on the initiative of the Secretariat of State for Secondary and Technical Education, will end tomorrow. It brings together, in addition to the representatives of the ministries of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Vocational Training, and Education and Basic Instruction, the secondary-education inspectors, heads of institutions and teachers from all regions of the country.

The sessions involve, according to the agenda, examination and overhauling of the programs and methods, the human resources, and the measures to be taken to increase the number of students going into technical education.

Three committees have been set up for this purpose, including a small committee charged to examine the modalities for the new 1982-1983 school year and the conditions of Arabization of technical education.

M'hamed Nabi, invited to speak at the opening of the proceedings, stressed that the holding of the seminar is an important and eminently positive initiative in view of the fact that the country is experiencing a considerable lag in the areas of vocational training and technical education.

The minister pointed out that the 16,000 students presently taking technical education constitute a ridiculously low percentage in the light of the country's needs for middle-level cadres. He expressed the hope that the seminar would open up ways capable of encouraging young Algerians to go into technical fields.

In his opening address, Mohamed Larbi Ould Khelifa, for his part, attempted to discern the reasons why technical fields are given a "cold shoulder" by stu-

dents. He stressed in particular the fact that the colonial heritage has a lot to do with the discredit felt for the "manual" professions. He added that it is necessary to eradicate this backward view of manual work by raising the awareness of the parents of students and the students themselves.

Algeria said previously, Mr. Ould Khelifa inherited upon independence a technical education that did not fit into the context of our national realities at the economic and social levels. Training was aimed mainly at forms linked to the development of the colonial economy, closely dependent on the development of the colonizing country.

After independence, the reduced number of students in secondary education led the country to make considerable efforts toward a quantitative increase.

The fact is that the annual operating cost for a student is close to DA 5,000.

The construction and equipping of a place in a technical-education secondary school is enormously expensive.

Technical education is very little developed, the numbers in it, currently estimated at 16,000 students, reflecting the total in secondary education. The demonstrates the low interest shown in this type of education, and the discredit that burdens the annual training on the part of the students, the parents and, alas, even some of the teaching personnel.

We have been forced into this state of affairs by historical conditions that do not correspond to our reality, to our ambitious economic-development objectives or to the widespread diffusion of technology.

Today, Larbi Ould Khelifa continued, the pressing needs for middle-level cadres and skilled specialists, essential for any organized production process, make it necessary for us to review, at the quantitative and qualitative levels, the objectives of technical education.

Above all else, the speaker added, it is up to us to inform the establishment and sensitize it and its environment to the overriding necessity of giving technical education the place it should rightfully have and of reducing the attraction toward white-collar jobs exerted on the students and of developing training of vocational and manual type, as has been stipulated by the National Charter and the resolutions of the Central Committee in its various sessions, notably those devoted to education and training.

A Necessity: Revision of the Current Programs

In order to do this, the program decided on proposes to achieve parity between general secondary education and technical education by the end of this decade, at which time our education and training establishments will have about 600,000 students, with a view to meet as well as possible the needs for middle-level cadres and skilled specialists, estimated at nearly 1 million in this decade.

In parallel, in order to ensure the best possible correspondence between the content of technical education and families' needs for employment and job posi-

tions, it is our task to revise the current programs. This particular point constitutes the central axis of the seminar that starts today. In order to give maximum scope to this meeting, representatives of the ministries concerned with the problems of training have been invited to participate in it.

Furthermore, Mr Ould Khelifa indicated, efforts are being made in the direction of strengthening the existing infrastructure. To this end, 43 technical schools will be built within the coming year, within the framework of the national prefabricated-building program. The training courses that will be developed in these establishments will respond to the regional economic conditions and to the local labor needs. More than 30 specialties, grouped in 5 courses, will be created in these technical schools. We propose, Mr Ould Khelifa stated, to modernize this type of education by the opening of courses centered on new occupational areas (microprocessor industry, plastics industry, biochemistry, etc). In order to accelerate further the carrying-out of this program, some technical-education courses will be opened next year in the general-education secondary schools, thus marking our firm desire to place these two types of education on an equal footing.

The infrastructure necessary for this operation--that is, the shops and the equipment--is presently being arranged for and censused. The so-called multipurpose secondary schools that have shops are going to be put to profitable use as of the coming school year.

The teachers necessary for this type of education will be trained, in large part, in upper-level technician training courses that we opened in the most important technical-education secondary schools at the beginning of the current school year.

120 Technical Schools and 15,000 Teachers

In parallel, efforts will be made with the Ministry of Higher Education to develop even further the training of technical-education teachers. The combination of these two operations will certainly enable us, on the one hand, to cover the needs, estimated at 15,000 teachers for the decade, for the opening of the 120 technical schools which would be created within the framework of the various development plans, and on the other hand, to ensure the gradual Arabization of the entire corps of teachers.

This ambitious program of expansion and diversification of technical education cannot be given complete concrete form without harmonious and permanent coordination with the various sectors that train and make use of labor, Mr Ould Khelifa also said; he further stated that expansion of this sector (technical education) cannot be envisioned unless the teaching corps' concerns of an economic, pedagogic and administrative character are completely taken in hand.

It is for this reason, Mr Ould Khelifa concluded, that, in application of the political orientations, the teachers have been closely associated in the preparatory work for this seminar and have set up the platform on which the reflections have developed which, by the very fact that they come from the bottom up, necessarily have a concrete and operational character.

INDUSTRIAL-CROP DEVELOPMENT REVIEWED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 30 May 82 p 12

[Article: "Industrial Crops--New Start Next Fall"]

[Text] Industrial crops, which help a great deal in reducing dependence on foreign sources for agricultural products such as tobacco, oleaginous products and livestock feed, are undergoing remarkable development in Algeria, after a certain regression due mainly to climatic factors.

The surface areas devoted to these crops vary between 40,000 and 50,000 hectares. They currently represent between 2 and 3 percent of useful agricultural surface area. Extension of these crops remains dependent on the program being carried out by the Institute for Development of Industrial Crops (IDCI), aimed at establishing the potentials of the various species by means of tests in several regions and at determining the possible zones of extension, with the plants' requirements and the agroclimatic conditions taken into account.

On the eve of the definition of the physical objectives of the 1982-1983 production plan, it proved necessary to have a certain amount of technical-economic information concerning the industrial crops. These data set out the essential reference points from which a production plan that conforms to the orientations of the 5-year development plan will have to be worked out for these crops.

The actions to be undertaken in this direction are aimed at continuing the efforts started as regards the crops of recent introduction, such as carthamus, sunflower and soya. They will also involve improving the production of the so-called traditional crops such as sugar beets, tobacco and industrial vegetables (peas, string beans), and more particularly, industrial tomatoes with a view to definitive coverage of the national needs for concentrate.

As for corn in kernel form, mainly for production of livestock feeds, the efforts undertaken by the IDCI are aimed at sensitizing the farmers so that they will speed up the interest in this crop required for promotion of it.

Setting Up Pilot Farms

For the 1982-1983 season, the IDCI is envisioning several kinds of action to promote development of industrial crops; among them are:

--writing a group of development operations into the framework of the investments making it possible to contribute to revival of certain crops such as kernel corn, tobacco-growing and oleaginous crops;

--better organization of specialized cooperation in the area of specific entrants;

--as regards popularization, the establishment of pilot demonstration parcels for all industrial crops;

--continuance of the mechanization program and making the producers aware of the advisability of acquiring the equipment appropriate for these crops;

--strengthening the training and popularization actions with the setting-up of pilot farms;

--harmonization of relations with the processing-industry organisms (preparation for marketing seasons, agreements and protocols on transport, storage, payment, etc);

--upgrading of the prices paid to the producers, on the basis of the real yields obtained.

These actions as a whole imply that all the agricultural and para-agricultural structures achieve a symbiosis between technical integration as a development tool and economic integration as a parameter of prime importance that has an effect on the social parameter.

The level of production of industrial vegetables, apart from tomatoes is not managing to rise to the level of the processing industry.

Objectives on the order of 20,000 hectares have been adopted by the planners with a view to covering the national-consumption needs, currently estimated at nearly 40,000 tons per year.

The interest taken by the producers in development of this crop has led the IDCI to set up a program for gradual introduction of new varieties at the level of certain production zones, generalization of mechanical planting where the equipment is available, intensification of technical surveillance and popularization sessions, mechanical-harvesting tests, etc.

Oleaginous Crops: Some Constraints

As regards the other industrial vegetables, during the 1982-1983 plan only the growing of industrial peas and string beans will be the subject of a program involving technical surveillance, popularization and support for production. This decision is in effect dependent on the existence of potential production zones, the establishment of processing units within these zones, presently underutilized, the evolution of the consumption patterns for these types of industrial vegetables, and the Institute's possibilities in terms of specialized technical oversight and the data acquired from experimentation.

For the annual oleaginous crops such as carthamus, sunflower and soya, which are of recent introduction and the cultivation experiments on which have al-

ready encountered a number of constraints of a technical and organizational nature, the experience acquired at the level of the experimental stations and the production units is presently making it possible to develop them on more rational bases.

The most significant actions carried out for promotion of these crops have involved better organization of the shipping of oilseed production to the oil mills of the SOGEDIA [Food Industries Management and Development Co], fighting the plant-health battle, introduction of precision seedlings, and the establishment of pilot parcels for the producers to refer to.

For the oleaginous crops, the objective set is to gradually reduce the gap between national production and imports, which are on the order of 250,000 tons of oil annually.

The growing of kernel corn can be considered an industrial venture by virtue of its production technology and its agroindustrial character (product intended for making livestock feeds).

Exodus of Specialist Labor Force

In view of the rate of development of the poultry sector and the increasingly higher consumption of chicken and eggs, the necessity of development of corn-growing is being felt more and more because of the fact that the imports--which also require enormous amounts of foreign exchange--cannot be ensured in toto [as published]. The needs for 1982 are estimated at nearly 3,183,000 quintals, and the figure is expected to reach 6.7 million quintals in 1984.

This situation has led to a review of the production process and the decision to mechanize the growing of kernel corn totally. The human and material resources will be organized gradually so as to achieve fulfillment of the needs.

Tobacco, another industrial agricultural crop, has become a widely consumed product. The needs are growing constantly, while national production remains below the rate of growth of consumption.

By way of indication, the needs for snuff and chewing tobacco are on the order of 5,000 tons per year, while annual national production does not exceed 4,000 tons. The needs for smoking tobacco are 16,000 tons. The area planted in smoking tobacco are far from covering the needs--whence the recourse to importation.

The exodus of the specialist tobacco-growing labor force to the industrial sector, which offers more advantageous remuneration, has considerably limited the extension of the surface-area planted.

The plan of action established for reviving this sector is aimed at experimental work and the selection of new varieties, so as to achieve a range of varieties adapted to the different production zones and greater support for the cooperatives in the area of collective sowing and making healthy and vigorous plants available to the producers.

There has been exemplary technical advance with sugar beets over the years. Its development plan can now be considered to be at the level of the countries specializing in this area.

For this crop, the producers have gone from the practice of multigerm seeds, requiring manual intervention, to the use of seeds of the technical monogerm type. On the basis of the recent work done abroad, that has made it possible to perfect a new type of seed--the genetic monogerm, far more advantageous on the productive and qualitative levels--the Institute has decided, after an experimentation program conducted in special stations, to include this new type of seed at the large-scale cultivation level. As regards the conduct of cultivation, efforts have been undertaken to make it possible to solve the problems connected with mechanization, the plant-health battle, irrigation and the training of the producers.

The objective for the 1982-1983 season is to achieve the two types, "fall" and "winter," of sugar-beet varieties so as to supply the El Khemis sugar mill without interruption for quite a long period.

With a view to gradual reduction of the large deficits that occasion importation in the area of industrial crops, it remains of prime importance for all the organs concerned in the preparation of the production plan to take rational action through assistance to the producers for numerical definition of their objectives.

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CSO: 4519/195

COMMENTARY ON COUP PLOTTERS' SENTENCES

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 120, 29 May-4 June 82 p 33

[Article: "Lenient Sentences' for the 'Terrorist Ring'"]

[Text] "Lenient Sentences" was the comment most commonly heard in popular Bahraini circles following the announcement of the sentences handed down in the case of the "terrorist ring" which intended, according to official claims, to undertake wideranging political assassinations, to occupy government buildings, and to blow-up certain important facilities as a prelude to announcing an "Islamic revolution" a la Iran. In the opinion of those who were following the case's developments at first hand, the "leniency" was apparent from the absence of the "death penalty" in the sentences passed over the accused. The sentences were relatively light (7 years') in the case of 10 of the accused whose ages, it was said, were under 20 years. This was despite the fact that the charges against them, of which they were found guilty, are punishable by death. The charges were: communication with a foreign power, membership in illegal organizations, and the possession of arms and explosives. The court of higher appeals which reviewed the cases sentenced three of the principally accused in the case to life imprisonment, 60 of them to 25 years' imprisonment, and the remainder to 7 years' imprisonment.

Apart from the particulars and the accompanying phenomena of the case, which we disclosed in previous issues one nagging questions remains in the minds of observers: Why weren't the accused sentenced to death? It is difficult to answer this question. No one is prepared to openly offer an opinion on the matter, or offer an orderly interpretation of the political aspect of the sentences. But by carefully following the opinions in circulation about the nature of the sentences handed down, it is possible to say that the application of these penalties in a small community continues to be constrained by family and social ties, which customarily give rise to some sort of adherence to "extremist religious tendencies" and "symbols" around which the former gather and call on their adherents to follow.

Some opinions hold that "the religious extremist trend still doesn't possess a social base, as is the case in Egypt. It is therefore possible to confine its potential spread rather easily, since it assumes a sectarian form, for the most part, in the way it deals with domestic political events". Those who hold this view believe that "there are numerous elements which a group like the

terrorist ring could turn into nothing more than words on paper, eg., the open society which is generally enjoyed by Bahrainis as a result of contact with the outside world, the spread of education early on in this century, and consequently, the spread of a relatively high degree of consciousness among local residents."

This view reveals an important truth, from a political aspect, in the course of its analysis of the court sentences, namely, that Bahrain has never throughout its contemporary political history witnessed a conspiracy of this sort or at such a level of plotting, except of course for the period of British hegemony over the islands' affairs. But most of the protests in that period were of a peaceful nature and did not contemplate the use of force to such an extent in order to overthrow the government.

Views such as these take refuge in the fact that "the sentences that were handed down have brought with them a feeling of relief among the populace and have created animosity toward the power that incited the individuals in the terrorist ring to commit such an act of 'madness'. Such a crime could end up diminishing the appeal of any ideology seeking to link the political future of Bahrain with that of a country such as Iran. Correspondingly, it could also deepen the gulf that exists between certain local factions and the Iranian ayatollahs."

However, there is one marginal point to make, and that is that the local media, including THE GULF NEWS (the sole daily newspaper), have refrained from speaking about "Iranian involvement" in the case. Even the publication of the sentences was worded carefully and with few reference to the "foreign power" which the accused tried to contact. Its name was not even mentioned. Perhaps this is due basically to the desire of the local authorities to play down the political aspect and to avoid getting involved in a campaign of accusations which might lead to a breakdown in relations between the two countries (Iran-Bahrain). This desire is not confined to Bahrain alone; the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states also share this desire, preferring instead to attempt in every way to settle peacefully the military conflict between Iraq and Iran.

9945

CSO: 4404/540

SUPREME PRESS COUNCIL ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 20 Jul 82 p 6

[Text] The Supreme Press Council, during its meeting yesterday under the chairmanship of Shura Council President Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, approved permits for establishing 22 scientific, social and cultural magazines and newspapers to be published by universities, organizations, companies and Islamic and Christian societies.

The council also approved permits for 52 [sic] journalists to work in information media abroad, including 26 journalists from the national [press] establishment and 27 non-establishment.

At the beginning of the council's meeting, two new members were sworn in: Hamid Zaydan, editor-in-chief of [the opposition SLP weekly] AL-SHA'B, and Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq, editor-in-chief of [the opposition NPUG weekly] AL-AHALI.

Discussed at the meeting were the following subjects: permits for journalists to work abroad; the regional press and the report submitted on its experiment in Ismailia; and raising the prices of announcements in the national press.

Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, following the meeting, said that the council, since its establishment until now, had not rejected the request of one journalist to work [presumably abroad] in non-Egyptian information media. He also said that the council at its next meeting will discuss a comprehensive report on the regional press.

CSO: 4504/429

ILL EFFECT OF HIGHRISE BUILDINGS ON CAIRO UTILITIES REVIEWED

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 13 Jun 82 p 2

[Article: "Will the Skyscraper Construction in Cairo Stop?"]

[Text] The rupture of water and sewer mains in Cairo has become a familiar thing, and electricity blackouts in one section or another for hours in the night or day have become commonplace!

In their state, the utilities in Cairo are deficient in coping with housing construction and expansion. Indeed, they have plunged the current population of the capital into exasperation.

If we request that suitable housing be allocated to every family, indeed, that the government earnestly strive to achieve this, then the question which arises is, should we build in Cairo, or should we stop building there and turn to the desert, to avoid adding new burdens to the delapidated utilities?

Perhaps the recent ruptures of sewage pipes in Misr al-Qadimah and al-Azhar are the basic motive for this question.

The basic premise in the answer to this question is, what is the situation regarding utilities now in the center of the capital? What is the state of affairs as we observe "skyscrapers" rising in Cairo every day, along with thousands of construction violations?

Just a Million

Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Ashmawi, head of the sewer system in Cairo, says:

"The sewer facilities in Cairo cannot endure any additional increase or burden. In fact, they are now incapable of coping with the existing population. Cairo is operating with a sewer system that is 38 years old, made to serve just a million citizens.

"Today there are 10 million people in Cairo, and the sewer system is required to accommodate them!

"Therefore it has become necessary to think about constructing a new sewer system in greater Cairo. It has been found that that would require 1.5 billion pounds; 400 million have been obtained in foreign currency, but the rest, which must be obtained from local capital, has not yet been procured!

"However, if we assume that a new system will be constructed, extending from al-Ma'adi to al-Amiriyah and serving just 14 million, which is the figure Cairo will reach as a result of the natural increase in births in 3 or 4 years, we will consequently go back to the same problem.

"Therefore it is necessary not to put up high buildings between the two areas, and to stop the building in greater Cairo altogether.

"We are being pressed to do that by the fact that it is expected that the new sewer system will be built in the middle of 1983. Until this system is built, we must realize that the existing system was designed to dispose of 1.8 million cubic meters a day while in reality it carries 3 million meters at the present time, which is the cause for the constant overflows.

"If we add new loads to that, a disaster will occur in the heart of the capital, which has almost stopped functioning! Indeed, this will have harmful effects on the health of citizens, roads and buildings!"

Dr 'Izzat Hilwah, director general of environmental health in the Ministry of Health, supports this view, adding:

"If the Cairo sewers continue as they are, that will lead to the spread of contagious diseases like typhoid, paratyphoid and hepatitis and eye diseases. This will consequently be reflected on people and on production.

"We must eliminate this perverse situation starting now, work speedily and seriously to set up a new system, and issue decisive decrees to stop the building in Cairo, or the vertical expansion in the existing buildings."

The Water System

This is the picture with regard to sewer facilities. The state of the water utility is no different; it is no longer capable of meeting the freshwater needs of the population of Cairo. This is clear from the complaints of people living in upper floors. In fact, the complaints have extended to the people living in lower floors as well, especially in the summer months!

Eng Muhammad Khalid Mustafa, vice chairman of the Greater Cairo Waterworks, says, in amazement:

"Can you imagine that the Cairo waterworks were built in 1865, that is, that they are now 117 years old?

"Cairo consumes 3 million cubic meters of water a day. Of this, 800,000 meters are well water, and the rest comes from the Nile, after it is filtered and purified in 13 water stations from Musturud in the north to al-Tabin in the far south, a distance of 50 kilometers.

"This means that the ground under Cairo is full of mains, pipes and large and small systems. However, the point of serious significance is that the daily number of complaints on water shutoffs has risen to 2,500, and this is a dangerous, difficult situation. What would one say if Cairo expanded and started to have skyscrapers? That would lead us to avoid adding additional burdens; Cairo has enough already!"

Electricity

What is the situation as far as electricity goes?

Can the existing system in Cairo bear the increasing loads being imposed upon it?

Eng Muhammad Mahmud al-Mughrabi, first deputy minister of electricity and chairman of Cairo Electricity, replies:

"The electrical load in Cairo increases 12 percent a year, which is very high when compared with the worldwide rate.

"Therefore, in order to cope with that, we are always performing intensified replacement and renovation work in generating plants in order to try to increase generating capacity by 50 percent; it is anticipated that this plan will be completed in early 1983. However, in spite of that, this increase will be swallowed up in a number of years!

"The life of the existing generating plants in Cairo ranges from 20 to 30 years, although their hypothetical life is just 15 years.

"That means that the life of the electric generating plants in Cairo ended a long time ago and we must strive with concentrated effort to keep them working!

"The question is to arrange financial credits first of all. Then we should not be anxious to make new construction expansions. The important thing is for us to learn of the areas where construction is planned so that electricity can be provided for them, and of course providing this requires money."

It Must Be Stopped at Once

What does the Housing Ministry think?

The ministry is working everywhere to erect more buildings which will therefore be capable of responding to citizens' needs and eliminating one of the problems the masses are suffering from.

Does it support the suspension of building in Cairo, or does it look at the problem from a single angle, that of providing appropriate housing for everyone?

Eng Ibrahim Najib, technical advisor to the Ministry of Housing, replies by stating,

"We must limit construction expansion activities in Cairo, since its utilities can no longer bear up. In fact, we must oppose the elevation of buildings, lest the heart of the capital be gripped with paralysis!

"We are now preparing plans for the Greater Cairo area which will be based on expanding development into a number of towns with independent utilities surrounding Cairo, such as the towns of 6 October, al-Amal, al-'Ubur and Badr.

"We must also lay emphasis on developing such new towns as 10 Ramadan, al-Sadat and al-'Amiriyah, so that they can assume the function of housing agglomerations which are

totally independent of Cairo. Indeed, the ministry is trying to transfer some activities in Cairo to these towns in an attempt to lighten the pressure on the capital."

Eng Ibrahim Najib warns that the problem is worsening every day and that if we do not counter it with a decisive, immediate solution, by stopping the construction in Cairo and preventing the elevation of existing buildings, we will find ourselves in a bad situation, which it will not be possible to correct later on.

This is the state of the utilities in Cairo, which are totally inadequate to offer services for the current inhabitants in Cairo, whose numbers are increasing at a terrifying rate.

We have no recourse but to suspend the new building in Cairo, if only on a temporary basis, and limit the construction of highrise buildings, until a day comes when the utilities are able to accomodate the demands of the present inhabitants.

At the same time, we must direct ourselves to building new towns with services and utilities which are totally independent of Cairo.

11887

CSO: 4504/388

CORRESPONDENTS ON 23-24 JULY BATTLES

JN250816 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0705 GMT 25 Jul 82

[Text] Baghdad, 25 Jul (INA)--Press dispatches by Iraqi correspondents from the front reported that the night before last and yesterday the Iranian enemy made four attempts to cross the borders in the sector of the Al-Miqdad forces east of Basra.

The dispatches, published here today, stated that the Iraqi fighters of Al-Miqdad forces foiled these attempts and inflicted heavy losses in life and equipment on the enemy.

The ATH-THAWRAH team reported that the enemy began its attack on Friday evening, tried again at 0330 on Saturday after bringing in reinforcement and a third time at 0600.

Citing fighters on the front, the ATH-THAWRAH team said that all these attacks had failed completely and the enemy sustained additional losses.

The AL-JUMHURIYAH team reported that the Al-Miqdad forces were waiting for these attacks and that their fire forced the enemy to withdraw after sustaining heavy losses in life and equipment. The team added that when the first attack failed, an enemy force disbanded and sought refuge in the revulets in the area to escape certain death. This enemy force was besieged until morning when it was completely wiped out. The enemy tried to approach our defense positions a third time. The Iraqi forces drove the enemy to an area where it would be easy to liquidate it, then carried out a counterattack and wiped it out. The team added that after the failure of all these attacks, the enemy carried out a new attack whose outcome was the same as the previous ones.

CSO: 4400/387

BAGHDAD REFUTES KHOMEYNI CLAIMS ON IRAQ

GF251545 Baghdad International Service in Azeri 1800 GMT 24 Jul 82

[Unattributed commentary: "The Mullah Is Again Talking About Blood"]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, the mullah breaks his fast with blood and it is with blood that he welcomes sacred 'Id. Therefore, the prayers performed by the mullah are not inspired by humane sentiments. On the contrary, they are inspired by Satanic feelings.

The mullah and his followers are hungry wolves wrapped in sheepskin. You are quite aware of the fact that clergymen think only of God and of the interests and affairs of the servants of God. They do not think of their own interests and do not choose any direction to walk except that of reality. A mullah must always wish for happiness and prosperity for others. He must pray that those who deviate from the path of truth return to the right course and that sinners are forgiven.

However, what can be expected of a warmongering mullah who is addicted to blood? What can he wish for? Today the mullah in Iran remains awake and [words indistinct]. He waits to hear about the horrible crime he has committed in the name of religion. He waits to hear about the outcome of his deceitful acts. The mullah remains awake to hear about the reaction against his attack on someone else's home. He waits to hear about the destruction of the property of a Muslim neighbor--a Muslim people who have historic relations with Iran. The mullah remains awake like a [word indistinct] but instead of raising his hands to Almighty God he extends them to the commanders of the murderous Pasdaran units and begs for their support. They should kill as many as they can and destroy as much as they can. This is because the mullah is (?merciless). He is one who seeks vengeance in a treacherous manner. He is ignorant of humane sentiments and devoid of humanity. His only wish is to shed blood.

However, there is no more blood left in our veins. You are drowning in the blood you have shed in Iran, a country which you have turned into a bloodbath.

You are no clergyman. You are another Hulagu [a descendant of Genghis Khan who destroyed Baghdad at the time of Mongolian thrust into Middle East]. You are

not innocent but a sinner. In fact, you are not an Iranian. That is why you are the enemy of the Iranian people. You have to leave Iran and the Iranians alone. You have bottled the blood of Iranian youths and resorted to crimes unprecedented in Iran's history.

You undermined the historic relations the Iranian people had with neighboring countries. You made the whole world look upon the Iranians with doubtful eyes. You have caused the world to regard the Iranians as members of a savage non-Muslim community. In total disregard of the [word indistinct] of the world, you have moved to deal hard blows to the sacred spirit of Ramadan. By organizing a military onslaught against Iraq, you intended to undermine the respect people have for this sacred month. You have failed to understand, however, that (?those who follow Satan) usually dig their own graves.

Your Iran is in a state of ruin. Nonetheless, you talk about reconstructing the homeland of others. Who are you to talk about reconstructing the homeland of others? Your intention is not one of (?coexistence). It is one for destroying the homes of innocent people and their children. If you are not a sinner--that is to say, if you are a man of God--then rush to the aid of the hungry and unemployed Iranians and to the aid of the refugees. Provide for the oppressed and turn the poor into wealthy people like yourself.

Mullah, look at Iran. That country, which was once famous for its natural resources, is today isolated and hopeless thanks to you and to your criminal band. Thanks to you, Iran is now shedding tears of blood. The Iranian people do not know what to do. Under the circumstances, you should think of Iran's salvation first and not the salvation of Iraq. Instead of endeavoring to liberate the Iraqi people, you must create the conditions under which the Iranian people can live with honor.

Mullah, you must understand that the Iraqi people have no need whatever for an insane and deceitful (?man) like yourself. This stems from the fact that the Iraqi people do not wish to live under the [words indistinct] and the blood-dripping banner of the (?Califate system). They do not wish to live under the yoke and [word indistinct] of a bloody executioner like yourself--an executioner who dreams of restoring the Persian empire. Iraq is a happy, independent, flourishing and prosperous country. Liberating the Iraqi people or granting them freedom is a nonsensical philosophy. Regrettably, by following this nonsensical philosophy, poor Iranians are dying for no reason at all.

Under the circumstances, if the Iranian people wish to have a happy life and enjoy freedom and leave a glorious name behind, they have to remove Khomeyni's bloody administration from Iran. There is no other alternative for the Iranians and this is the truth.

CSO: 4400/387

BAGHDAD ATTACKS SYRIA, IRAN OVER ACCESS THROUGH IRAQ

GF241405 Baghdad International Service in Azeri 1800 GMT 21 Jul 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Summary from poor reception] Dear listeners, the conspiracies of the Iranian rulers, who dream of restoring the Persian empire, have been foiled. Also foiled are the Satanic intentions and plans of the rulers in Damascus and Tripoli, who have been assisting the Khomeyni regime in its efforts to set up a bloody regime. Following criminal Israel's thrust into Lebanon and the subsequent silence of certain circles in the face of this onslaught, they planned to obtain an access through Iraq to fight with the occupiers of Lebanon who are in reality their brethren. According to them, this road has to pass through Iraq regardless of the blood of Iraqi youths.

"But are they sincere in their wish to fight Israel? Are they sincere in their wish to liberate Jerusalem? Are they sincere in their wish to liberate the Lebanese soil occupied by Israel and give it back to the PLO? If they are sincere, why do they insist on crossing through Iraq at the risk of disrupting Iraq's peace, independence and territorial integrity? Is it not possible for Iran to send its troops via Syria?" Is it not a fact that the policy pursued by Iran is one of the main reasons for southern Lebanon's occupation by the executioners in Tel Aviv?

In fact, southern Lebanon has become the victim of the slogans uttered by the Iranian mullahs. Had the Iranian rulers been sincere in their wish to liberate Lebanon from enemy occupation, they would not have ordered their troops against their Iraqi brethren. They would not have moved to destroy Iraqi cities and towns and Iraq's economic resources.

"Khomeyni knows well that the road to Jerusalem crosses through neither Karbala' nor Al-Najaf. He also knows well that there are routes other than Baghdad. Damascus and Tehran are exchanging views daily regarding Baghdad and the effort to hatch new conspiracies. However, they are dreaming and their conspiracies are being foiled every day." Actually, the following is what they want to achieve: disruption of Iraq's policy, obstruction of the Iraqi resistance against Iran, removal of the current administrators of Iraq and the creation of conditions under which illiteracy will flourish in Iraq once again.

Nevertheless, the conspiracies aimed at achieving the abovementioned objectives are being foiled by the determined stand of the Iraqi people.

It must be understood that Khomeyni does not wish to pray in Al-Najaf or Karbala'. He uses this merely as an excuse to mislead his people. What he actually intends to do is to realize an international conspiracy in the region at the expense of the blood of Iranian youths. Khomeyni and his followers intend to increase their wealth at the expense of bloodshed. Therefore, the Iranians must pull themselves together and silence the terrorists and their supporters.

CSO: 4400/387

IRAQ

RCC REPORTEDLY CONSULTS KURDS ON THEIR PROBLEMS

JN251853 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Revolution in Surani Kurdish 1500 GMT
25 Jul 82

[Text] On 20 July 1982, Al-Sulaymaniyah governor, his deputy and the chief of police summoned the government employees to the governor's office. After a long discussion, the police chief told the employees that orders have been received from the so-called Revolution Command Council [RCC] in Baghdad that the employees should meet with the people and hear their views on a solution to the Kurdish problem. The police chief authorized the employees to discuss this issue with the people in the open and in writing. He said: We wish to find a solution to your problems with your cooperation. We want to know your basic demands and submit them to the Iraqi leadership.

The police chief then spoke about the amnesty granted recently by the hangman of Iraq [Saddam Husayn]. He also spoke about the order allowing those who were forced to leave their homes to return to them provided they do not settle in the forbidden zone which extends 10⁰ km inside Iraqi territory from Iraqi borders. He said that those families which have spent 10 years in houses built for them by the government can now claim these houses as their own property.

It should be noted that these offers by the fascist regime are aimed at deceiving the people and diverting their attention from the regime's antipeople and chauvinistic policy. The regime is trying to absorb the wrath of the people by lies and deception.

CSO: 4400/387

IRAQ

BRIEFS

TANKER INSURANCE--London, 24 Jul (INA)--British insurance companies have doubled insurance sums on oil tankers going to the Iranian oil terminal of Khark, reliable sources told INA correspondent here today. The sources said the measure was adopted in the wake of the Iraqi warning to international oil tankers not to approach the Iraqi oil terminal of Khark since it is regarded as a military operations area. [Text] [JN241545 Baghdad INA in English 1530 GMT 24 Jul 82]

EXECUTION OF ARMY OFFICERS--Informed sources in Baghdad have asserted that Iraq's butcher Saddam Husayn has recently arrested and executed dozens of the Iraqi armed forces' best officers in a desperate attempt to contain the state of anger and unrest in the armed forces. Early this month, tyrant Saddam executed Brig Gen Fadil al-Jiburi; Staff Lt Col 'Abd al-Juhsin 'Abdallah Hasan, commander of the 12th Armored Brigade of the Third Division; and Lt Col Muhsin 'Ali al-Jiburi. On 15 July, the commander of the Second Division, Brigadier General Jasim, was executed. He was one of the most brilliant officers in the Iraqi Army. These informed sources also said that Iraq's butcher launched an arrest campaign late last month in which the following officers were arrested: Brig Gen Jawad As'ad, commander of the Third Division; Brig Gen Salah al-Qadi; Brig Gen Suhayl Isma'il Faqqi; and Brig Gen Burayd al-Qaddu. [Text] [JN241859 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Revolution in Arabic 1500 GMT 24 Jul 82]

CSO: 4400/387

INVESTMENT INCOME APPROACHING OIL REVENUE LEVELS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 121, 5-11 Jun 82 p 45

[Article: "The Bahrain International Investment Center: Kuwait's Income From Investments Is Approaching Its Oil Revenues"]

[Text] The Bahrain Ministry of Trade recently agreed to announce the establishment of the Bahrain Center for International Trade after the founders gave up 3 of the 10 goals originally established for the center.

The goals which had caused a dispute between the Bahrain Ministry of Finance and Kuwaiti investors pertained to borrowing and lending, and issuing stocks for the international market. These clearly banking endeavors were opposed by Bahrain's minister of finance, Mr Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim.

The Bahraini authorities later formed a government committee consisting of Prime Minister Shaykh Khalifah ibn Sālmān and the ministers of trade and finance to devise a sound and practical framework for a financial policy to govern investment companies in Bahrain and foreign bank branches known as "off-shore" banks. It will eliminate any confusion that might arise in the future over any encroachment on the prerogatives of the ministries concerned with trade and banking activity in Bahrain.

The announcement of the formation of this committee was accompanied by government warnings to the citizens not to become victims of speculation, and to keep away from speculating in real estate. During the 1970's several decisions were made allowing Gulf citizens to own land in Bahrain. This induced a number of citizens to engage in land speculation, leading to more than a few bankruptcies because the citizens were not familiar with the rules of the game. The government's warning was accompanied by an unequivocal announcement that it would not step in to reimburse those who suffer losses engaging in speculation. These warnings are believed to have been made to prevent any negative impact on the activities of Gulf investors, particularly since Bahrain has experienced an investment boom following the announcement that citizens have the right to subscribe to shares in [tax-] exempt companies. Three banks--the Bahrain International Bank, the Bank of Bahrain and the Middle East, and the Arab Investment Bank--offered their stock to the public in less than three months. The main role in these installations has gone to the Kuwaiti investors because of their long experience in investment.

A Wide-Ranging Discussion

Kuwaiti investments have been a topic of discussion recently not only in the Gulf. There has been a continuing controversy, although different in nature, over Kuwaiti investments in Europe, specifically in West Germany. The cause was the announcement that Kuwait had purchased 25 percent of the stock of the Hoechst Chemical and Pharmaceutical Company. Hoechst is not only the largest West German company in its field, but is also one of the biggest companies in the world.

The announcement of the deal and the way it was concluded raised again the old question of sensitivity to foreign investments, particularly inasmuch as the deal amounted to the purchase limit of 25 percent of the stock, for \$600 million. This is the limit which cannot be exceeded by foreign investors in any German company. But the Western press has generally focused on the gradual approach by which the Kuwaitis have been able to gain this high percentage of ownership. They have been buying the shares through holding companies in Switzerland and elsewhere, which keeps the Kuwaiti identity hidden. In fact, the situation was not completely clear until after the purchase of all the shares had been completed. An announcement of this Kuwaiti presence is expected at the company's annual meeting to be held on the 8th of next month.

In a recent report in the British magazine the ECONOMIST Kuwaiti investments in West Germany alone are reported to approach 25 percent ownership of about 20 industrial companies, such as Deimmler Benz, which manufactures Mercedes cars, a Volkswagen plant in Brazil, the (Kwrf) Steel Company and others.

In England, where foreign investors are required by law to make public any deal in which more than 5 percent ownership is acquired, the Kuwaiti ownership does not exceed 10 percent in about 47 companies of various sorts.

But the important thing is this, according to the same Kuwaiti report, is that income from Kuwaiti investments has reached a high level, approaching the income from oil. Income from these investments is expected to reach \$10 billion at the end of this year, compared with \$12 billion from oil. Kuwait will thus be able to fill the gap in its budget caused by its decrease in oil-production to about 650,000 barrels a day.

9123

CSO: 4404/536

'SPA' REVIEWS SAUDI PRESS ON MIDDLE EAST, GULF SITUATIONS

LD261330 Riyadh SPA in English 1200 GMT 26 Jul 82

[Press review]

[Text] Riyadh, 26 Jul (SPA)--Saudi newspapers today hailed the kingdom's role on the questions of Palestine, Lebanon and Afghanistan and said King Fahd's call for Islamic unity was "timely and valuable at such a dangerous situation" in the Arab region.

AL-RIYAD, published here, said King Fahd's address on the occasion of Al-Fitr feat had set new guidelines for the Arab and Islamic nation and highlighted the kingdom's new diplomatic strategy and its great role in "cleaning the Arab house."

"Moreover, the Saudi monarch's call came at a most difficult time for the Arab and Islamic nation due to the worsening situation in Palestine, Lebanon and Afghanistan," the paper added.

The paper said the kingdom's wise and moderate policy had succeeded in winning over the Western countries "respect and support for Arab rights."

AL-JAZIRAH, published here, praised King Fahd's statemanship and said he was one of the leaders who used "logic and reason" to handle the Arab nation's affairs.

The paper said King Fahd had acquired issues and his keenness to preserve world peace and security and avoid global wars.

Meanwhile, the Jidda-based 'UKAZ said the Saudi monarch's address reflected the kingdom's sincere efforts to "rescue the Palestinian and Lebanese people from their tragedy and foil the Zionist plots in Lebanon."

The paper referred to the kingdom's international efforts to "check Israel's atrocities, put an end to its criminal aggression on the Palestinian and Lebanese people and ensure Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon."

'UKAZ said King Fahd's address had put forward practical steps to "confront the enemies conspiracies and challenges against the Arab and Islamic nation and ensure its security and stability."

The paper said the Saudi monarch's call had demonstrated the kingdom's prime concern to achieve Arab and Islamic unity and solidarity.

Meanwhile the Jidda-based AL-MADINAH dealt with the kingdom's "distinguished role" in the defence of the Gulf region.

The paper referred to the Bahraini heir-apparent Shaykh Hamad ibn 'Isa al Khalifah's current visit to the kingdom and said it was in the framework of coordination and consultation among the leaders of Gulf states to devise measures to "protect the Gulf region from foreign ambitions."

AL-MADINAH said the kingdom's armed forces equipped with the most sophisticated armoury had a "great responsibility to help other sister states in the region in developing their armed forces so that they can defend the security and stability of the Gulf region."

The paper referred to the talks between the second Deputy Premier and Defence and Aviation Minister Prince Sultan and Shaykh Hamad and their visits to military installations in the kingdom's southern region.

It added that collective or bilateral coordination among the Gulf states or Arab League members would help in strengthening the Arab force and cadres.

CSO: 4400/387

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

CALL FOR END TO WAR--Riyadh, 26 Jul (SPA)--A Saudi newspaper today called on Iran and Iraq to respond positively to the kingdom's call to stop the war which it said had cost the two countries thousands of deaths and hundreds of millions of dollars. The Mecca-based AL-NADWA said past experience had shown that peace could not be achieved by mere wishes and statements, but by adopting practical stands. It praised the Iraq leader's "good intentions" and desire to settle the conflict peacefully on the basis of neighbourly relations and respect for the two countries sovereignty. The paper said the kingdom and other Gulf leaders had warned the two countries of the dangerous consequences of the war and its impact on the security, independence and stability of the region. It expressed "cautious optimism" about reports which said Iran had agreed to a new Algerian mediation bid to resolve the 22-month-old conflict. [Text] [LD261340 Riyadh SPA in English 1211 GMT 26 Jul 82]

CSO: 4400/387

LAST YEAR'S LABOR STATISTICS SUMMARIZED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 407, 21 Jun 82 p 18

[Text] In 1981, the government adopted a certain number of measures in order to encourage employment and the establishment of businesses. A recent assessment reveals that these measures have produced appreciable results. We are providing some of the figures in this assessment here.

1. Projects Launched

The law of 23 June 1981 divided the territory in zones and gave the neglected zones greater advantages. Zones 3, 4 and 5, covering the entire territory except for Nord-Est, Sousse, Sfax and Gabes, obtained the following results:

	First half 1981	Second half 1981	1982 (April)
Number of projects approved	347	423	360
In percentage	+43%	+56%	+54%
Invested, in percentage	+65%	+64%	+68%
Jobs, in percentage	+49%	+58%	+60%

Source: API [Investments Promotion Agency]

2. Training-Employment Contracts

The August 1981 law established training-employment contracts. At the end of the month of May, the results achieved were as follows:

Future estimates: 12,000 contracts per year.

Contracts approved: 3,220 contracts as of 24 May 1982.

Offers open: 398 as of 24 May 1982.

The goal is to complete the signing of 10,000 contracts for the year 1982 as a whole.

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs.

Aid to Craft Projects

Since crafts account for a large percentage of the jobs, efforts are being made to finance craft projects.

A. Establishment of structures to aid craft production in six regions: Tunis, Nabeul, Jendouba, Monastir, Mahdia, and Medenine.

B. Goals: establishment of this structure in the 22 regions.

C. Files submitted to the banks: 654.

Files approved: 60 (February-April).

The goal is to create 3,000 jobs.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. Placement Abroad

Emigration continues to be a source of jobs. In the course of the first 5 months of 1982, placements abroad have yielded the following results:

Departures between 1 January 1982 and 26 May 1982 for Libya: 4,830
for France: 593 seasonal workers and 50 FPA (Adult Vocational Training)
apprentices
for Saudi Arabia: 108 workers and 20 FP apprentices
for Jordan: 66
for Iraq: 59
for Kuwait: 31
for Austria: 17
for other countries: 11.

Total: 5,785

Cooperation With the Gulf Nations

Kuwait: 415 technicians have been selected but have not yet departed, as have
43: United Arab Emirates
24 for Qatar
14 for the Sultanate of Oman and
93 for Saudi Arabia.

Thus some 600 are expected to depart shortly.

Source: OTTEFP [Office for Occupational Training, Employment, and Tunisian Workers Abroad].

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DOMESTIC MIGRATORY PHENOMENA EXAMINED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 407, 21 Jun 82 pp 36-37

[Article by Youssef Hechmi: "Social and Geographic Mobility and Regional Balance"]

[Text] Only a sociological survey in depth could undertake to determine migratory phenomena and their direct and latent effects, and to an even greater extent, go beyond the observation phase to establish the causes. Our goal is rather to describe a phenomenon which was a profound characteristic of the 1960's, but which is remembered in various quarters solely in terms of the rural exodus aspect--particularly the migration toward Tunis.

In fact, Tunis has always attracted a heavy proportion of the migrant population. The reasons for this attraction are familiar to all. The city, which today has more than 1,200,000 inhabitants, has seen its population triple, if not quadruple, in a period of two decades. The capital has become the greatest pole of attraction--by far--for migration in the country, although the population growth there has equaled the immigrant flow.

But this approach takes into account only one single aspect of domestic migration. Today, in order to correct the human and economic imbalance among the regions, it is necessary to establish the outlines of the population problem in its broader context.

Thus the question of internal migration is probably one of the most important issues in the current stage of growth and in particular in the establishment of general guidelines to be implemented in the future. It is basically a problem in that it exerts a direct influence on the economic progress and sociopolitical development of the country.

For a country such as ours, in which the demographic pressure is still constant--and not, however, from this point of view solely--it is necessary to master the consequences of the migratory phenomenon both in terms of social balance and regional potential.

Social and geographic mobility is a major factor in the development of the country. Social mobility is conditioned by geographic mobility. An example

will illustrate this fact. It is the neglected regions, those which have developed the least, which experience the largest number of departures to the cities and, at a higher level, toward the coastal towns.

For as long as we fail to succeed to "motivate" the people to settle in their native areas by providing them with access to sources of income and collective equipment, the desired development plan for the nation as a whole is in danger of being distorted and altered.

What is still worrisome is the inertia and inactivity to which certain regions of the country once rather populated and enjoying a certain socio-economic dynamism seem to be doomed. This situation is explained by a rather recent change in the migrant structure. We are dealing more and more with young people, more or less educated, who are leaving the fields or fleeing their regions of origin to settle in Tunis and its surrounding areas.

The scope of the migratory phenomenon, which moreover reveals new types of shifts, interregional in particular, is certainly a worrisome problem and one basic to the future of the country. Responsible officials are certainly aware of it. Plans have been drafted to correct the regional imbalance and to bring about the human and geographic mobility which is so desirable as a factor in development.

The increased interest devoted to the neglected regions showing a migratory deficit for some years now shows that the public authorities have really become aware of the problem and of what needs to be done with a view to suitable mastery of the migratory phenomenon. But apart from this inertia, the desire to alter the facts is first of all the concern of the populations involved, including the young, who are most of all called upon to contribute to the development of the neglected regions, so that the need to try their luck elsewhere will no longer be felt.

Depopulation of the Rural Sector and Overpopulation in the Towns

It is this demographic development which, while a worry to the public, the authorities, sociologists and urban specialists, nonetheless continues, destroying that balance which is so essential among the regions.

Although substantially reduced, according to the recent 1975-1980 census, migratory trends within the country continue to reflect the special redistribution of the population.

Mr Chedli Trifa, an official at the National Statistical Institute, describes this development as follows.

It is with a view to a better approach to economic and social planning that it is important to understand the specific aspects and the intensity of the migratory flow and the internal mobility trends. Do they not have a decisive impact on population growth and therefore on the economic progress and urban structure of these "departure zones," as well as the "arrival zones?"

It has in fact been established that migration involves two geographic points: origin and destination. This does not however mean that any shift, for an extended or final stay, from one street to another or one neighborhood to another is regarded as migration.

Within the framework of the last general population census, carried out in 1975, the concept of migration is defined as being a move from one administrative unit to another.

Thus we limit ourselves to assessing migratory movements made from one district to another or one governorate to another. And special track is kept, in particular, of the migratory shifts between the rural and the urban environment, a trend commonly called the rural exodus.

Here again, various approaches lead to an understanding of the phenomenon.

With the first approach, each person questioned is asked about his district of birth. With the second, he is asked about his previous district of residence, prior to that in which he is living at the time of the survey, and the date he took up his present residence, for the purpose of establishing the most recent vector of migration. With the final approach, he is asked in what district he resided at a previously established date: 1969. This is a key date important to the country because of the occurrence of two rather important events, i.e., the change in economic policy and the floods, followed by the breakdown of transportation routes and the isolation of certain regions.

These various approaches are utilized within the framework of the general population census, which is the main source of information for assessing the migratory flows.

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AGRICULTURE'S PLACE IN SIXTH PLAN VIEWED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French N° 402, 17 May 82 pp 36,37

[Article by Othman Gharbi: "Ambition and Pragmatism"]

[Text] The very special interest the authorities feel in agriculture right now is reflected in practical terms in the Sixth Plan, where development of this sector of the economy gets top priority. There will be a lot of incentives to farmers to set up sound and profitable operations. At completion of the Sixth Plan, Tunisian agriculture will be completely transformed.

High on the list of the Sixth Plan's priorities is agriculture. The forecast for the sector calls for a 5-percent growth rate. Total amount of investments required in agriculture comes to 1,360 million dinars, out of a total budget for the Sixth Plan of 8,000 million dinars, or 17 percent. The average investment in agriculture, which was 50 million dinars annually through the Fourth Plan, rose to 117 million in the Fifth Plan, and will hit 272 million dinars during the Sixth Plan, which runs from 1982 through 1986.

This reveals a major increase in agricultural investments involving all factors in the economy (administration, public and private enterprise), but with heavy involvement of the private sector in putting these agricultural investment packages together, at a far higher cost than called for under any of the previous plans.

While in the areas of farm water supplies, forests, water and soil conservation, fisheries, and extension services, the government's share of investment will be predominant, covering the majority of essentials, private enterprise will move in to a considerable extent in cattle-raising, farm machinery, and orchards. The same applies to the food crop and farm commodities sectors (storage, pre-processing, etc.).

The legal setting for this massive intervention is contained in the Farm Investment Code, which also calls for both advantages and obligations for investors, particularly the requirement that they

make good use of the advantages offered them, either through sound reclamation, improvement, and utilization of land, or through sound backing for agricultural projects.

The code will be particularly helpful to projects that will create new permanent jobs in farming; employment is another top priority in the Sixth Plan.

Investments promising immediate and sure return will also be given preferential treatment in some regions, in view of the predominance of this type of investment (60 percent) in the Sixth Plan. The Northwest, Center-West, and South are all concerned here. In fact, the whole country stands to profit by this code, since promotion of agricultural investments has not yet reached a level requiring all-out decentralization, as was the case with industry. There are some coastal areas still greatly in need of development.

There will also be a requirement to take realistic account of all available data -- soil, climatic, and socio-economic -- with a view to increasing the technical content of farm operations in simultaneous interaction with investment and employment.

This technical assistance with a view to enhancing both the viability of target operations and the added value of their production will be managed by the operator himself with the aid -- if need be -- of the government.

Finally, this code calls for implementation of a number of incentive plans, ranging from loans to tax credits, all designed to provide maximum incentive for profitable agricultural investment.

The APIA

While the code organizes farm investment on appropriate legal foundations, the Agency for Encouragement of Farm Investments (APIA) affords a remarkably potent tool for ferreting out and publicizing investment opportunities in the agriculture sector, for giving an opinion based on the requests for approval submitted by would-be investors and to help them in setting up files of applications for financial, tax, and other assistance provided under the farm investment code. Once approval is granted, the project becomes fundable and credible, and hence assured of completion, according to a timetable consonant with the funding plan.

When on 16 January 1981 the government approved the idea of setting up this agency, it underscored the necessity of making all farmers, without discrimination, profit by its services, no matter what the size of their operation.

This was a prudent step in a country where the vast majority of farmers in fact work either small or medium farms.

If it is to accomplish its mission, the APIA must be the sole agency dealing with the farm investor, even if it must deal with other agencies or businesses on behalf of the investor himself. There is, in fact, nothing that so chills the enthusiasm of an eager investor as bureaucratic red tape, mountains of paper-work, futile trips to one office or another, and the cost of it all in wasted time.

We must not forget that repeated postponements and proliferation of procedures can turn a carefully completed file into waste paper, and make it necessary to start all over again from scratch. For example: every estimate has a termination date, after which it is no longer valid.

Either the encouragement program is going to be anti-bureaucratic or it is not.

FO.PRO.D.A.

The Agricultural Development Incentive Fund (FO.PRO.D.A.) is one more device available to farm investors, since it will enable them to qualify for considerable financial assistance in the form of reimbursable grants, or short-term forgiveness of interest rates on their loans, etc.

What we have here is a real support fund, capable of helping to get capital together in case such assistance proves vital.

The New Agriculture Bank

Finally, the National Farm Development Bank will provide the credit required by approved projects, particularly those which will take some time to show a profit.

This new structure became necessary in the light of the limited assistance available to farm investors at the so-called commercial banks, despite all the incentives and other encouragement offered them over time. No doubt the new institution will also play the role of pump-primer in getting them to go along; that, after all, is one of the proper functions of a development bank.

Severally and in combination, these new structures will support and guide agricultural development through the Sixth Plan and beyond, and will make it possible to funnel investments into profitable channels.

Encouragement for setting up sizable agricultural projects that will create jobs, at a high technological level or of a nature to increase exports will go hand in hand with a substantial increase in credit available to small and medium operators through the traditional agencies (the Special Agricultural Development Fund [FOSDA] and others) which will benefit by expanded regional and central support.

Here again, there must be a serious and concerted effort to simplify and expedite bureaucratic procedures, in order to complete the decentralization process that has been in effect since 1980.

For the rest, the problem here will lie rather in the formation of viable service cooperatives and in stopping the practice of splitting up ownership of farmland, either by giving the oldest member of the family the right to keep the family holdings intact, for example, or by means of any other acceptable formula designed to achieve the same end.

In the final analysis, the Sixth Plan has clearly defined the respective roles of public and private investment in agriculture. Their roles are perhaps distinct from one another, but they are certainly complementary. Roughly speaking, you have infrastructure and land improvement on the one hand, and encouragement of investment on the other. The division of labor is rational.

This decision is an act of faith in the encouragement and expansion of Tunisian agriculture by the farmers themselves, whose efforts during the Fifth Plan, in spite of extremely adverse weather conditions, were altogether outstanding; what they still need, though, is stronger solidarity and greater efficiency.

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END